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Abstract 
Is consciousness a binary on/off property? Or is it on the contrary a complex phenomenon that can be 
present in different states, qualities, and degrees? We support the latter and propose a linear incremental 
scale for consciousness applicable to artificial agents. ConsScale is a novel agent taxonomy intended to 
classify agents according to their level of consciousness. Even though testing for consciousness remains an 
open question in the domain of biological organisms, a review of current biological approaches is discussed 
as well as their possible adapted application into the realm of artificial agents.  
Regarding to the always controversial problem of phenomenology, in this work we have adopted a 
purely functional approach, in which we have defined a set of architectural and behavioral criteria for each 
level of consciousness. Thanks to this functional definition of the levels, we aim to specify a set of tests that 
can be used to unambiguously determine the higher level of consciousness present in the artificial agent 
under study. Additionally, since a number of objections can be presumably posed against our proposal, we 
have considered the most obvious critiques and tried to offer reasonable rebuttals to them. Having neglected 
the phenomenological dimension of consciousness, our proposal might be considered reductionist and 
incomplete. However, we believe our account provides a valuable tool for assessing the level of 
consciousness of an agent at least from a cognitive point of view.  
 
1. Introduction 
Testing for consciousness remains an open problem even when it is aimed at humans or other mammals. 
The scientific study of consciousness differs from any other scientific scrutiny due to the fact that 
consciousness is private and subjective while traditional scientific methods are based on public and objective 
observations. However, most contemporary neuroscientists agree that consciousness can be tackled 
scientifically using alternative strategies. Additionally, we believe that establishing a framework for 
classifying, measuring, and testing the level of consciousness of a subject is of central importance in the 
scientific quest for consciousness. Provided that first-person analysis alone cannot offer a convincing 
scientific value, alternative third-person standpoints can be adopted in terms of behavior and neurobiological 
structures analysis. Although these alternative third-person approaches cannot offer a direct inspection of 
consciousness, we believe they are of useful scientific value. In fact, analogous indirect observations have 
been extensively applied in other scientific domains like atomic physics. Basically, the hypothesis that we 
support in this work is that the level of consciousness of a biological organism could be accurately assessed 
by correctly analyzing two aspects: the presence of Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCC) and the 
presence of characteristic behaviors. When it comes to artificial agents, we adopt the same methods but they 
cannot be directly applied due to the following reasons: (1) Artificial agents have different underlying 
machinery, instead of NCC we should refer to functionally analogous Computational Correlates of 
Consciousness (CCC) (Atkinson, Thomas & Cleeremans 2000). (2) Artificial agents produce different 
behavioral patterns. As embodiment in artificial agents differs significantly from humans or any other 
biological organism, the generated behavior, which is deeply influenced by the body physical 
characterization, also differs. 
While some authors advocate for the necessity of a specific physical substrate for consciousness, see for 
instance Hameroff and Penrose (1996), others support the idea that consciousness is produced by specific 
processes that could be reproduced in different substrates, e.g. Edelman and Tononi (2000), Crick and Koch 
(1990), and Grossberg (2003) amongst others. The latter approaches allow the possibility of Machine 
Consciousness and this is indeed the hypothesis that we support. Although the precise way in which the brain 
produces consciousness is not clear yet, we argue that specific aspects of consciousness can be analyzed and 
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sorted adopting an evolutionary perspective, from phylogenetically older functions to the most modern 
features observed in human adults.  
Taking into account the former considerations, a scale designed to test the level of consciousness of 
artificial agents called ConsScale has been recently proposed (Arrabales, Ledezma & Sanchis 2008). 
ConsScale is a taxonomy, actually defined as an ordered list, intended to classify artificial agents according 
to their level of consciousness. ConsScale is also intended to serve as a reference framework for analyzing 
the existing correlation between consciousness and cognitive skills; furthermore, it is expected to be a 
realistic reference to determine the current state of the art in the field of Machine Consciousness.  
The following sections introduce the context and objectives of ConsScale. Firstly, current methods for 
assessing the level of consciousness are discussed in section 2. Our computational approach to consciousness 
in artificial agents is explained in section 3. ConsScale levels are briefly described in section 4. A short 
discussion on the theoretical foundations of the scale and possible objections is presented in section 5. 
Finally, section 6 includes a consclusion and future work. 
 
2. Current methods for assessing the level of consciousness 
Determining the level of consciousness of a living organism is a hard problem. The actual definition of 
levels is indeed an open question and clinical diagnosis methods for humans like the Glasgow Coma Scale 
(GCS) or Simplified Motor Score (SMS) do not cover the broad range of consciousness functional 
components (Gill et al. 2007; Van de Voorde et al. 2008). There also exist psychological scales which are 
focused in specific aspects of consciousness like the Private Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein, Scheier & 
Buss 1975). However, neither neurological nor psychological tests of this sort can be directly applied or 
plausibly adapted to artificial agents.  
From a cognitive point of view, one could think that some sort of Turing test might be a plausible 
solution (Turing 1950). However, such a test cannot provide a measurement of the level of consciousness for 
subjects not reaching the human-like level. Even for that level, mere observation of external behavior is not 
enough (Haikonen 2007b). 
From the neuroscience perspective, Seth, Baars, and Edelman (2005) propose a set of criteria for 
consciousness in humans and other mammals. A number of these criteria are based on neurobiological 
aspects. If the NCC and the associated activity patterns that give place to consciousness are identified, then 
we can look for them in animals endowed with a central nervous system. Additionally, if some behavioral 
patterns are identified as uniquely produced by conscious subjects, we can design experiments where these 
behaviors are tested.  
Other proposals exist to test the presence of consciousness in artificial agents. However, they are not 
designed as gradual scales but unitary tests. The most remarkable work in this area is the set of axioms 
proposed by Aleksander and Dunmall (2003) and Aleksander and Morton (2007). According to the authors, a 
minimal set of axioms (depiction, imagination, attention, planning, and emotion) are required in order to 
consider an agent conscious. Additionally, Haikonen has pointed out that the ability to report mental content 
(to itself and to others) is also a requirement for consciousness. Inner speech with grounded meanings is one 
manifestation of mental content and the system’s ability to report this would thus be an indicator of the 
presence of consciousness (Haikonen 2007b). As explained below, these criteria are also considered in 
ConsScale. 
 
3. A computational approach to consciousness in artificial agents 
In order to characterize consciousness as a property of agents we need to formally define the basic 
components of an artificial situated agent, i.e. the conceptual building blocks integrated in a possible 
artificial consciousness implementation. Then we could test the presence of these functional components, 
their interrelation, and the corresponding behavioral outcome in order to assess the level of machine 
consciousness.  
An agent interacts with the environment by retrieving information both from its own body and from its 
surroundings, processing it, and acting accordingly. Following Wooldridge’s definition of abstract 
architectures for intelligent agents (Wooldridge 1999), and taking into account the embodiment aspect of 
situated agents, we have identified a set of essential architectural components: sensors, sensorimotor 
coordination, internal state (including memory), and effectors. These subsystems implement the basis of the 
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following processes: perception, reason, and action. Cognition and learning can develop in an agent on top of 
the former processes during the interaction with the external world and their own inner state. Consequently, 
the following abstract architectural components can be identified: 
• Body (B). Embodiment is a key feature of a situated agent. Agent’s body can be physical or 
software simulated (as well as its environment). A boundary is established between agent’s body 
and its environment (E). The rest of components are usually located within this boundary.  
• Sensory Machinery (S). Agent’s sensors are in charge of retrieving information from the 
environment (exteroceptive sensors) or from the agent’s own body (propioceptive sensors). 
• Action Machinery (A). In order to interact with the environment the agent uses its effectors. Agent’s 
behavior is composed of the actions ultimately performed by this machinery. 
• Sensorimotor Coordination Machinery (R). From purely reactive agents to deliberative ones, the 
sensorimotor coordination system is in charge of producing a concrete behavior as a function of both 
external stimuli and internal agent’s state. 
• Memory (M). Internal agent’s state is represented both by its own structure and stored information. 
Memory is the mean to store both perceived information and new generated knowledge. We 
consider that even agents that do not maintain state can be said to have a minimal state represented 
by its own structure, i.e. preprogrammed sensorimotor coordination rules.  
The former components refer to an abstract architecture; therefore, we are not considering here any 
particular agent implementation or concrete sensorimotor machinery. Using the presented abstract 
architecture allows us to define consciousness levels independently of particular implementations. As 
Wooldridge (1999) has pointed out, different classes of agents could be obtained depending on the concrete 
implementation of the abstract architecture. It is also important to note that no specific component of this 
architecture is responsible for the production of consciousness. Instead, we support that consciousness could 
emerge from the interaction of the specialized processes present in the agent.  
In computational terms, consciousness can be regarded as a unique sequential thread that integrates 
concurrent multimodal sensory information and coordinates voluntary action. Hence, consciousness is 
closely related with sensorimotor coordination. Our aim is to establish a classification of agents according to 
the realization of the functions of consciousness in the framework of agent’s sensorimotor coordination.  
Out of the set of cognitive functions that an intelligent agent could potentially exhibit, the following 
group of functions specifically characterizes the behavior of a conscious agent: Theory of Mind (ToM), 
Executive Function (EF), and modulating function of emotions. ToM is the ability to attribute mental states 
to oneself and others (Vygotsky 1980). From a human developmental standpoint, Lewis (2003) suggests four 
stages in the acquisition of ToM: (1) “I know”, (2) “I know I know”, (3) “I know you know”, and finally (4) 
“I know you know I know”. Undoubtedly, ToM is required in order to implement any sort of social learning. 
The term EF includes all the processes responsible for higher level action control, in particular those that are 
necessary for maintaining a mentally specified goal and for implementing that goal in the face of distracting 
alternatives (Perner, Lang 1999). Attention is an essential feature of EF. It represents the ability of the agent 
to direct its perception and action, i.e. selecting the contents of the working memory out of the entire mind’s 
accessible content. Planning, coordination, and set shifting (the ability to move back and forth between tasks) 
are also key processes included in EF. Emotions play a key role in the generation and modulation of behavior 
even in organisms that lack self-consciousness. In organisms with higher levels of consciousness, like 
humans, the feeling of emotions enables the interaction and competition between emotional and rational 
responses. Effective learning in complex and unstructured environments requires these cognitive skills. We 
argue that the effective integration of all of these cognitive functions could build an artificial conscious mind. 
However, each of the mentioned functions could also be implemented independently or partly integrated 
with other cognitive functions, thus giving place to different levels of implementation of artificial 
consciousness as discussed in the next section.  
 
4. ConsScale 
The fact that consciousness is an incremental property can be easily observed in both human ontogeny 
and other mammals’ phylogeny. Most complex learning capabilities and higher cognitive skills are generally 
observed in those species with higher levels of consciousness. The level or degree of consciousness that a 
biological creature is endowed with seems to increment correlated with a concrete path of evolution, 
showing the highest levels in quadruped mammals and great apes, and reaching its maximum expressions in 
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the case of Homo sapiens sapiens. The definition of concrete and functionally discrete levels of 
consciousness permits us to have a pragmatic reference framework for classifying artificial agents. Table 1 
describes ConsScale, which is a sorted list of potential levels of consciousness for artificial agents. This scale 
has been defined in terms of reference abstract architectures, characteristic behaviors, and cognitive skills. 
As illustrative analogy, machine consciousness levels are assigned a comparable level of consciousness in 
biological phylogeny and human ontogeny. 
The first level in the scale, level -1 or Disembodied, refers to a ‘proto-agent’ and serves as an initial 
reference that remarks the importance of a body as a requirement for defining a situated agent. The rest of 
the scale comprises a set of twelve ranks, where lower levels are subsumed by higher ones. Therefore, each 
stage of the incremental development of an artificial agent could be identified by a concrete level.  
Level 0, Isolated, is also a conceptual reference which helps characterizing situatedness in terms of the 
relation with the environment. It represents an inert body lacking any functionality or interaction with the 
medium except the inevitable derived from the physical properties of its proper inactive body.  
Level 1, Decontrolled, represents an agent which is endowed with some sensorimotor machinery, which 
for some reason is not functional at all (or it lacks a functional relationship between S and A). Therefore, this 
is also a conceptual reference level. Systems which belong to either level 0 or level 1 cannot be defined as 
situated agents.  
Level 2, Reactive, defines a classical reactive agent which lacks any explicit memory or learning 
capabilities. From level 2 onwards the agents make use of the environment as the mean to close the feedback 
loop between action and perception. Hence, all agent types above level 1 can be regarded as situated agents. 
The characteristic behavior of this level is the reflex, hence an agent able to autonomously react to any given 
environment situation is said to comply with level 2. 
Level 3, Adaptive, can be identified as the simplest form of an adaptive agent. At this level, the agent’s 
internal state is maintained by a memory system and sensorimotor coordination (R) is just a simple function 
of both perceived and remembered information. Propioceptive sensing can be present at this level; however, 
it is not producing any self-awareness. At this level, learning mechanisms are possible as new reflective 
behaviors can be acquired. When the response to a given environment state is not fixed, but it is a function of 
both the information acquired by S and agent’s internal state (M), then the agent is said to comply with level 
3 (note that some propioceptive sensing mechanism is required to make agent’s internal state available in R, 
so it can be an input of the sensorimotor coordination function). Level 3 can also be seen as an evolution of 
level 2 in which a capability for learning new reflexes has been acquired.  
Level 4, Attentional, is characterized by an attention mechanism, which allow the agent to select specific 
contents both from the sensed and stored state information. This means that explicit learning is directed 
toward selected objects or events. However, implicit learning mechanisms also exist, like the acquisition of 
reflective strategies which is also a characteristic of the former level. If the agent is able to direct attention to 
a selected subset of the environment state (Ei) while other environmental variables are also sensed but 
ignored in the explicit processing of R, and the selected perception is automatically evaluated in terms of 
agent’s goals allowing subsequent responses to be adapted (emotions), then the agent is said to comply with 
level 4. Attentional agents are able to show specific attack or escape behaviors and trial and error learning. 
The ability to pay attention toward specific objects or events gives place to the formation of directed 
behavior, i.e. agent can develop behaviors clearly related to specific targets, like following or running away. 
Additionally, level 4 agents can have primitive emotion mechanisms in the sense that the objects to which 
attention is paid are elementally evaluated as positive or negative. A positive emotion triggers decrease of 
distance behavior or bonding to selected object, while negative emotion triggers increase of distance and 
reinforcement of boundaries toward selected object (Ciompi 2003). Moreover, a new relation between 
emotions and memory appears at this level: as demonstrated in biological organisms, emotions are deeply 
involved in the selection of what needs to be stored in memory (LaBar, Cabeza 2006). Basically, level 4 can 
be seen as an evolution of level 3 in which the attention capability has been acquired. 
A level 5 agent, Executive, includes a more complex reasoning and internal state representation, which 
provides set shifting capabilities. The achievement of multiple goals is performed thanks to a higher 
coordination mechanism that shifts attention from one task to another. The agent is also endowed with a 
mechanism to evaluate the performance in achieving the pending goals. This mechanism is the self-status 
assessment provided by emotions (which was already present in the former level). The presence of emotions 
associated to objects and events jointly with the set shifting capability permits the development of 
reinforcement learning mechanisms. In addition to advanced planning, emotional learning is another 
characteristic that can be observed at this level, as the most emotionally rewarding tasks are assigned more 
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time and effort. In sum, level 5 can also be seen as an evolution of level 4 in which goal seeking and set 
shifting capabilities have been acquired. 
Level 6, Emotional, is the first level in which an agent can be to certain extend regarded as conscious 
(but not self-conscious). The main characteristic of this level is the support for ToM stage 1, “I know”. 
Feelings appear as representations of organism changes due to an emotion (Damasio 1999). As the effects of 
emotions in the organism are mapped, a sense of “I know” appears in the agent. 
Level 7, Self-Conscious, corresponds to the emergence of self-consciousness. At this level the agent is 
able to develop higher order thoughts (Rosenthal 2000), specifically thoughts about itself. Consequently it 
presents support for ToM stage 2, “I know I know”. This requires the presence of a model of self in the 
agent, which in turns permits advance planning as the proper agent is part of the plan. Therefore, learning 
mechanisms can operate now in the realm of anticipated future. The agent can plan about itself, and later 
learn if the plan was efficient or not. Recognizing the self as a character in the plan seems to be a key factor 
for learning to use tools (Sasaki et al. 2008). The reference behavior test for this level would be the mirror 
test, which although originally applied to primates (Gallup 1977), has also been adapted to other mammals 
and even artificial agents. Takeno et al. have proposed a specific experiment design to test whether a robot is 
able to recognize its own image reflected in a mirror (Takeno, Inaba & Suzuki 2005). 
In level 8, Empathic, the internal representation of the agent is enriched by inter-subjectivity. In addition 
to the model of the self, others are also seen as selves; hence, they are consequently assigned a model of 
subjectivity. This is the seed for a complex social interaction. This capability in addition to the ability to hold 
a precise and updated map of body schema, i.e. body shape and posture (which is acquired in level 6), is 
necessary for the learning of tool usage and for the making of new tools (Maravita, Iriki 2004; Stout, 
Chaminade 2007). Being aware of others permits the conscious collaboration with other agents in the pursuit 
of common goals.  
The next step is represented by level 9, Social, where ToM is fully supported. In this case, agents are 
strongly influenced by the social environment and a culture can be potentially developed. Characteristic 
behavior of this level is defined by sophisticated Machiavellian strategies (or social intelligence) involving 
social behaviors like lying, cunning, and leadership. In other words, an agent A could be aware that another 
agent B could be aware of A’s beliefs, intentions, and desires. Advanced communication skills are the 
characterization of this level behavior, where, for the first time, an agent would be able to purposely tell lies. 
There exist mathematical models of the dynamics of Machiavellian intelligence that could be potentially 
used to test these sorts of behaviors with artificial agents (Gavrilets, Vose 2006). 
Level 10, Human-Like, represents the sort of agents endowed with the same level of consciousness as a 
healthy adult human. Therefore, the formation of a complex culture is a feature of this level. This implies the 
usage of external complex tools for learning. The abstract architecture for both level 9 and 10 is the same. 
The real difference in level 10 comes from the fact that culture affects the mind, i.e. the way the brain is 
used. Accurate communications skills (language) and the creation of a culture would be a clear feature of this 
level. Other key characteristics are that level 10 agents are able to profoundly modify their environment and 
society. The fluidity between social and technical intelligence permits the extension of their own knowledge 
using external media (like written communication) and technological advances are also possible. 
Finally, level 11 or Super-Conscious, refers to a kind of agent able to internally manage several streams 
of consciousness, while coordinating a single body and physical attention. A mechanism for coordination 
between the streams and synchronized access to physical resources would be required at this level. We 
cannot envisage any conclusive behavior test for level 11 due to the lack of known exemplifying references.  
 
5. Theoretical foundations and application of ConsScale 
The main point to take into account about ConsScale is that it is based on a functionalist approach and it 
is bio-inspired. The levels of artificial consciousness defined in ConsScale are characterized by abstract 
architectural components and agent’s behavior. It must be noted that R and M do not represent centralized 
modules. They represent the substrate that supports functions that can be carried out by any distributed 
machinery. In other words, the proposed scale is based on specialized processes rather than specialized 
machinery. The architecture components represent functional subsystems whose integration makes possible 
the emergence of a characteristic behavior. Therefore, at least one behavior-based test might be associated to 
each level in order to assess if a particular agent fulfills the minimum required behavioral pattern for that 
level. In fact, an agent can only be assigned a concrete level if and only if it is able to show the behavioral 
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pattern of that level as well as the behavioral patterns of all lower levels. In other words, higher levels 
subsume all lower ones (except the three first levels). As discussed above, the three first reference levels 
(Disembodied, Isolated, and Decontrolled) are a special case as they do not actually describe situated agents. 
Therefore, it does not make sense to have behavioral tests associated to any of these first three levels. A 
given agent could be assigned either of these initial reference levels just by analyzing its architectural 
components. In contrast, from level 2 onwards a characteristic behavior pattern is defined per ConsScale 
level. This characteristic pattern should be taken as the base of any behavior test that can be assigned to a 
particular level.  
An obvious critique to the proposed scale can be based on the fact that it merely follows a particular 
discretized linear path within the virtually infinite map of possible artificial agent implementations. Why 
have we chosen this particular arrangement of conscious levels? Why not some functionality could be in 
different levels? The short answer is that this is a bio-inspired scale and we have tried to specifically select 
and identify the most significant levels of phylogenetic and ontogenetic development that have led to human-
like consciousness. The main reason is that evolutionary development of humans is the most advanced 
example we know of building a conscious agent. For instance, as observed in biological organisms, generally 
doing precedes understanding. As indicated by Haikonen (2007a), explorative actions seem to be a 
requirement to be able to learn to make sense of perceptions. Therefore, ConsScale considers capability for 
explorative actions in the lower levels of the scale. This ability is combined with cognitive skills like 
imagination at higher levels of the scale. Also, from the point of view of emotions, embodiment and action 
have to be present before any cognitive process takes place (James 1884), e.g. we learn to speak before 
learning syntax or grammar. Bodily representations of emotion follow perception, and as Damasio (1999) 
has pointed out, the feeling of the emotion is what finally causes the conscious state associated to the 
emotion.  
The following features are added incrementally in ConsScale: perception and action capabilities, basic 
situatedness, basic emotions, basic adaptiveness, attention, explorative actions and set shifting, feelings, 
planning, imagination, Theory of Mind, language, and culture. These functions cannot be considered as 
unitary features, instead an integrated grand function of consciousness should be considered as being present 
to the degree specified at any given level. For instance, having the ability to develop imaginations but not 
being able to adapt to the environment and perform explorative actions is useless in terms of building a 
conscious agent. This is the reason why we have designed a linear scale, not taking into consideration any 
possible ‘hybrid’ levels in which the required sensorimotor machinery and behavior are not in the line that 
lead to human-like consciousness in biological evolution. 
 
6. Conclusions and future work 
We have proposed ConsScale as a machine consciousness taxonomy for artificial agents, which can be 
used as a conceptual framework for evaluating the potential level of consciousness of a given agent. To our 
best knowledge, most of current implementations of artificial agents fall between levels 2 and 4 inclusive. 
The classification of any current implementation as fully belonging to level 5 or higher could be thoughtfully 
discussed elsewhere; nonetheless, we think these kinds of agents are within current technology possibilities. 
Identifying consciousness by means of interpreting behavior remains an open problem that is being 
currently addressed primarily in mammals, cephalopods, and birds (Seth, Baars & Edelman 2005). However, 
more effort should be put in the domain of artificial agents.  
The controversial aspects of consciousness have been addressed in this work with a functional 
characterization of consciousness based on the notions of embodied intelligence and the integrated grand 
function of consciousness. 
In order to effectively apply the proposed scale to a particular agent, concrete tests have to be defined. 
Learning capabilities associated to each level are the key to define such behavioral test cases. However, the 
cognitive foundations of advanced learning capabilities like tool usage and the making of tools remain 
controversial. The application of the proposed scale could help in the clarification of the role that higher 
cognitive functions play in advance learning. Therefore, future work regarding ConsScale includes designing 
experiments and reference behavior patterns for levels 2 to 11. 
 
 
Nokia Workshop on Machine Consciousness 2008 
55 
 
Acknowledgements 
We wish to thank Pentti Haikonen for his kindly support at Nokia Research Center, his valuable 
comments and corrections, and granting us the opportunity to participate in the outstanding Nokia 
conference. This research has been also supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science under 
CICYT grant TRA2007-67374-C02-02. 
 
References 
Aleksander, I. & Dunmall, B. (2003), Axioms and Tests for the Presence of Minimal Consciousness in Agents, Journal 
of Consciousness Studies, vol. 10, no. 4-5. 
Aleksander, I. & Morton, H. (2007), Why Axiomatic Models of Being Conscious? In R. Chrisley, Clowes, R., and 
Torrance, S. (eds.) JCS special issue on Machine Consciousness. vol. 14. no. 7. pp. 15-27. 
Arrabales, R., Ledezma, A. & Sanchis, A. (2008), Criteria for Consciousness in Artificial Intelligent Agents, 
ALAMAS&ALAg Workshop at AAMAS 2008, eds. F. Klügl, K. Tuyls & S. Sen, , pp. 57-64. 
Arrabales, R., Ledezma, A. & Sanchis, A. (2007), Modeling Consciousness for Autonomous Robot Exploration, in 
IWINAC 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4527. pp. 51-60. 
Atkinson, A.P., Thomas, M.S.C. & Cleeremans, A. (2000), Consciousness: Mapping the Theoretical Landscape, in 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences. vol. 4, no. 10, pp. 372-382.   
Ciompi, L. (2003), Reflections on the role of emotions in consciousness and subjectivity, from the perspective of affect-
logic, Consciousness & Emotion, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 181-196. 
Crick, F. & Koch, C. (1990), Towards a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness, Semin Neurosci, no. 2, pp. 263–275. 
Damasio, A.R. (1999), The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness, Heinemann, 
London. 
Edelman, D.B., Baars, B.J. & Seth, A.K. (2005), Identifying hallmarks of consciousness in non-mammalian species, 
Consciousness and Cognition, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 169-187. 
Edelman, G.M. & Tononi, G. (2000), A Universe Of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination, Basic Books, 
NY. 
Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M.F. & Buss, A.H. (1975), Private and public self-consciousness: Assessment and theory, 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, no. 36, pp. 1241-1250. 
Gallup, G.G. (1977), Self-recognition in primates: A comparative approach to the bidirectional properties of 
consciousness, American Psychologist, no. 32, pp. 329-337. 
Gavrilets, S. & Vose, A. (2006), The dynamics of Machiavellian intelligence, PNAS, vol. 103, no. 45, pp. 16823-16828. 
Gill, M., Martens, K., Lynch, E.L., Salih, A. & Green, S.M. (2007), Interrater Reliability of 3 Simplified Neurologic 
Scales Applied to Adults Presenting to the Emergency Department With Altered Levels of Consciousness, Annals 
of Emergency Medicine, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 403-407. 
Grossberg, S. (2003), The Brain's Cognitive Dynamics: The Link between Learning, Attention, Recognition, and 
Consciousness, Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems; LNCS, eds. V. Palade, R.J. 
Howlett & L.C. Jain, Springer, pp. 5. 
Haikonen, P.O.A. (2007a), Essential Issues of Conscious Machines, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 14, no. 7, 
pp. 72-84. 
Haikonen, P.O.A. (2007b), Robot Brains. Circuits and Systems for Conscious Machines. John Wiley & Sons. UK. 
Hameroff, S.R. & Penrose, R. (1996), Orchestrated reduction of quantum coherence in brain microtubules: A model for 
consciousness, Toward a Science of Consciousness, eds. S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & A. Scott , MIT Press. 
James, W. (1884), What is an Emotion? Mind, no. 9, pp. 188-205. 
LaBar, K.S. & Cabeza, R. (2006), Cognitive neuroscience of emotional memory, Nature reviews. Neuroscience, vol. 7, 
no. 1, pp. 54-64. 
Lewis, M. (2003), The Emergence of Consciousness and Its Role in Human Development, Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, vol. 1001, no. 1, pp. 104-133. 
Maravita, A. & Iriki, A. (2004), Tools for the body (schema), Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 79-86. 
Perner, J. & Lang, B. (1999), Development of theory of mind and executive control, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 
3, no. 9, pp. 337-344. 
Rosenthal, D.M. (2000), Metacognition and Higher-Order Thoughts, Consciousness and Cognition, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 
231-242. 
Sasaki, S., Hongo, T., Naitoh, K. & Hirai, N. (2008), The process of learning a tool-use movement in monkeys, with 
special reference to vision, Neuroscience Research, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 452-456. 
Seth, A., Baars, B. & Edelman, D. (2005), Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals, Consciousness 
and Cognition, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 119-139. 
Stout, D. & Chaminade, T. (2007), The evolutionary neuroscience of tool making, Neuropsychologia, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 
1091-1100. 
Nokia Workshop on Machine Consciousness 2008 
56 
 
Takeno, J., Inaba, K. & Suzuki, T. (2005), Experiments and examination of mirror image cognition using a small robot, 
Proceedings of the 2005 IEEE International Symposium on Computational Intelligence in Robotics and 
Automation, pp. 493-498. 
Turing, A. (1950), Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Mind. 
Van de Voorde, P., Sabbe, M., Rizopoulos, D., Tsonaka, R., De Jaeger, A., Lesaffre, E. & Peters, M. (2008), Assessing 
the level of consciousness in children: A plea for the Glasgow Coma Motor subscore, Resuscitation, vol. 76, no. 2, 
pp. 175-179. 
Vygotsky, L.S. (1980), Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes, Harvard University 
Press. 
Wooldridge, M. (1999), Intelligent Agents in Multiagent Systems: A Modern Approach to Distributed Artificial 
Intelligence, ed. G. Weiss, The MIT Press, pp. 27-78. 
 
 
Table 1. ConsScale levels of consciousness. 
Level of Machine 
Consciousness 
Abstract 
Architecture Short Description 
Featured 
Behavior
Biological 
Phylogeny 
Human 
Ontogeny 
Level -1 
Disembodied 
Boundaries of the 
agent are not well 
defined. It can be 
confounded with 
the environment. 
None. It is not a 
situated agent. 
Amino acid as 
part of a 
protein. 
n/a 
Level 0 
Isolated 
There is an 
obvious distinction 
between body and 
environment, but 
no autonomous 
processing.
None. It is not a 
situated agent. 
Isolated 
chromosome. n/a 
Level 1 
Decontrolled 
Presence of 
sensors and/or 
actuators, but no 
relation between 
them. 
None. It is not a 
situated agent. Dead bacteria n/a 
Level 2 
Reactive 
Fixed reactive 
responses. R 
establishes an 
output of A as a 
predetermined 
function of S.
Primitive 
situatedness 
based on 
reflexes. 
Evolutionary 
learning.
Virus n/a 
Level 3 
Adaptive 
Actions are a 
dynamic function 
of both memory 
and current 
information 
acquired by S. 
Basic ability to 
learn and 
propioceptive 
sensing allow 
orientation and 
positioning 
behavior.
Earthworm 1 Month. 
Level 4 
Attentional 
Attention 
mechanism selects 
Ei contents from S 
and M. Emotions 
are present. 
Ability to direct 
attention toward 
selected Ei allows 
attack and 
escape 
behaviors. 
Directed learning. 
Fish 5 Months. 
Level 5 
Executive 
Multiple goals can 
be interleaved as 
they are explicitly 
represented in 
memory.  
Set shifting 
capability allows 
multiple goal 
achievement. 
Basic emotional 
learning. 
Quadruped 
mammal 9 Months. 
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Level 6 
Emotional 
Feelings. Support 
for ToM stage 1: “I 
know”. 
Feelings provide 
a sense of self-
status and 
influence 
behavior. 
Monkey 1 Year. 
Level 7 
Self-Conscious 
Support for ToM 
stage 2: “I know I 
know”. 
Self-reference 
makes possible 
advanced 
planning. Use of 
tools. 
Monkey 1.5 Years. 
Level 8 
Empathic 
Support for ToM 
stage 3: “I know 
you know”. 
Making of tools. 
Social behavior. Chimpanzee 2 Years. 
Level 9 
Social 
Support for ToM 
stage 4: “I know 
you know I know”. 
Linguistic 
capabilities. 
Ability to develop 
a culture. 
Human 4 Years. 
Level 10 
Human-Like 
Human like 
consciousness. 
Adapted 
Environment (Ec) 
and culture. 
Accurate verbal 
report. Behavior 
modulated by 
culture (Ec). 
Human Adult 
Level 11 
Super-Conscious 
Several streams of 
consciousness in 
one self. 
Ability to 
synchronize and 
coordinate 
several streams 
of consciousness. 
n/a n/a 
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